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departure from traditional concepts is a juvenile court decision concerning the custody of an illegitimate child.4' The normal rule is that the
mother of the child is entitled to custody and the fact that the child is
illegitimate does not mean that the mother is therefore so immoral that
she should be denied custody. Apparently the theory is that the mother
may mend her ways. In re Dake' indicates that there is a "point of no
return" in these cases. A young lady who had never married but had
given birth to four illegitimate children was permanently deprived of
custody, although there was very little evidence of the mother's unfitness
aside from the fact that pregnancy had become a habit.
HUGH A. Ross

EQUITY
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Personal Service Contracts
In Central N. Y. Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett & Cleveland Basketball Club, Inc.1 the defendant, a professional basketball player, was under a
yearly contract to render personal services to the plaintiff, a team in
the National Basketball Association. The contract contained a so-called
"reserve clause" by which the player agreed to play only for the plaintiff
unless released, sold, or traded. The contract also provided that in the
event the parties should fail to agree upon the terms of a next succeeding
yearly contract, the plaintiff had the right to renew the contract and fix
the compensation to be paid.?
The parties entered into negotiations for a contract for the 1961-1962
season which negotiations, the court found, resulted in an oral understanding between them as to terms. The plaintiff then mailed a written
contract containing the terms to the player who refused to sign it.
As a result, the plaintiff notified the defendant-player by mail that it was
renewing the previous yearly contract in accordance with its renewal
option. Meanwhile, an agent of the corporate defendant, a team in a
competing professional basketball league, had negotiated a contract under
which the defendant-player agreed to play. The plaintiff then sued,
successfully, to enjoin the player from playing for the corporate defendant and to enjoin the latter's interference with plaintiff's contract with
the defendant-player.
Courts of equity will not normally specifically enforce contracts for
43.
44.

In re Dake, 180 N.E.2d 646 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1961).
Ibid.
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personal service because to do so would amount, at least in theory, to
compelling involuntary servitude. But in exceptional cases where the
services to be performed require special knowledge or unique skill and
ability of the employee, equity has granted relief by way of enjoining
the employee from rendering his services to others, normally competitors
of the plaintiff. This is despite the fact that such an injunction may, as a
practical matter, strongly tempt the employee to perform for the plaintiff.? However, if the employee's services are not unique he will not
normally be enjoined from working for a competitor.4 In the instant
case the evidence was to a degree conflicting as to the uniqueness of the
player's talent, but the court ruled that the fact that the player was a professional itself indicated that his skill was sufficiently unique to support
injunctive relief.5
The defendants challenged the validity of the contract on the ground
that, because of the reserve clause, it lacked mutuality of obligation, presumably on the ground that although the plaintiff had an option to renew, the defendant-player did not. The argument continues that equity
might enjoin the player from working for the plaintiff's competitor without having any assurance that the plaintiff would renew the contract. In
accordance with the modern trend of decisions,' the court, citing Fuchs v.
Motor Stage Co. gave the mutuality argument short shrift by observing
that as long as the plaintiff complies with the conditions of the contract,
there is sufficient consideration to support equitable relief. The result
seems clearly sound, since the plaintiff had in fact renewed and would
have been bound had the player carried out his part of the bargain.
Protections of Trade Names and Customers Lists
National City Bank v. National City Window Cleaning Co.8 involved
a suit by an old and established Cleveland banking institution against a
recently incorporated window cleaning company. The plaintiff obtained
an injunction against the defendant's use of the term "National City" in
1. 181 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
2. The compensation to be paid was at a rate not less than a specified percentage of that
stipulated in the contract of the preceding year.
3. See, e.g., Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 Ad. 973 (1902); Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson, [19371 1 K.B. 209; Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, 118 Eng.
Rep. 749 (1853); Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G. & M. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 604 (1852).
4. See Frederick Bros. Artists Corp. v. Yates, 271 App. Div. 69, 62 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1946),
reversing 186 Misc. 871, 61 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. 1946), afl'd mem., 296 N.Y. 820, 72
N.E.2d 13 (1947).
5. 181 N.E.2d 506, 517 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
6. Gould v. Stelter, 14 111. 2d 376, 152 N.E.2d 869 (1958); Morad v. Silva, 331 Mass. 94,
177 N.E.2d 290 (1954); Walter v. Hoffman, 267 N.Y. 365, 196 N.E. 291 (1935).
7. 135 Ohio St. 509, 515, 21 N.E.2d 669, 672 (1939).
8. 180 N.E.2d 20 (Ohio Cr. App. 1962).
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connection with its business. The court found that the term had acquired
a distinctive associational significance and noted that to permit its use by
the defendant would likely create in the minds of the public the impression that the plaintiff was in some way sponsoring or backing the defendant's enterprise, or would permit the defendant to trade upon the good
will built up by the plaintiff. Citing Henry Furnace Co. v.Kappleman,9
the court stated that the injunction would lie even though the defendant
was in a noncompeting business.
It may be noted in passing, however, that to the extent a defendant's
business is unrelated to the plaintiff's, confusion as to source with its
consequent trading upon good will is less likely to exist. Witness the
usual classroom example of "V-8," a mark which is the designation of a
particular automotive engine, a brushless shaving cream, an after-shave
lotion, a hair dressing formula, and a vegetable juice drink at one and
the same time."0
The case of Commonwealth Sanitation Co. v. Commonwealth Pest
Control Co." involved competing businesses. In this case the plaintiff,
an exterminating company, successfully sought an injunction against the
use of the name "Commonwealth" by two of its former employees in
competing companies incorporated by them. But the plaintiff was unsuccessful in its attempt to enjoin the defendants from soliciting plaintiff's customers for themselves. The plaintiff had not taken the precaution of exacting a written contractual promise from the individual defendants that, in the event they left the plaintiff's employ, they would not
compete with the plaintiff. When they established competing businesses
of their own, they solicited the customers of their former employer whose
names they remembered.
Citing the Restatement of the Law of Agency, the court noted that,
in the absence of a contrary agreement, although an agent after termination of the agency owes to his principal a duty not to use written lists
of names or other similar confidential matters given him for the use of
his principal only, he may use "general information concerning the
method of business of the principal and the names of the customers retained in his memory, if not acquired in violation of his duty as agent
....,12 The court concluded that because it is generally known in the
exterminating business who the most frequent customers are - hotels,
restaurants, bars, bakeries, grocers, and apartment house owners, businesses whose names are available in a city or telephone directory - the
9. 91 Ohio App. 451, 108 N.E.2d 839 (1952).
10. See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 35" (2d Cir. 1945).
Brands, Inc. v. Eastern Shore Canning Co., 172 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1949).
11. 178 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 396 (1958).

Cf. Standard
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plaintiff's lists of customers was not confidential and an injunction against
the defendants' use of it would not lie. 13
The court noted the existence of conflicting lines of authority: one
allowing the solicitation of customers of a former employer in the absence of a restrictive covenant or fraud; the other prohibiting it. It might
have been preferable for the court simply to have relied upon the formet
line of authority, rather than basing its decision on the nonconfidential
character of the plaintiff's list, for although lists of potential customers
for an exterminator's services may well be universally available, the
plaintiff's particular list was not publicly available and was known to the
defendants only because of their former employment by the plaintiff.
DEED RESTRICTIONS

Nichols 4

Swineford v.
was a suit by lot owners in an allotment to restrain the defendant from operating a beauty parlor allegedly in violation
of uniform covenants restricting the use of the lots to residential purposes.
The defendant operated the beauty shop on the ground floor of her split
level residence. She caused a listing to be inserted in the yellow pages of
the telephone directory and advertised in a local newspaper. Noting that
the business required no alterations in the construction or character of the
building as a residence, and that operation of the beauty shop did not
materially affect the value of adjoining properties or annoy neighbors,
the court concluded that the operation did not, under the circumstances,
violate the restrictive covenant and it refused to enjoin the operation. It
did, however, enjoin the defendant from advertising. Perhaps it would
have been preferable for the court simply to have refused to render its
aid in the enforcement of the covenant, rather than holding there was no
violation, since the evidence apparently indicated that the operation of the
beauty parlor did not result in any substantial detriment to the plaintiffs.
It is difficult to see how the absence of advertising for a commercial establishment renders it any less non-residential; it is easier, perhaps, to see its
relevance to the substantiality of the injury.
STANDING TO SUE

Daily Monument Co. v. Crown Hill Cemetery Ass'n "5was a suit by
a monument dealer for an injunction to prevent the defendant, a nonprofit cemetery corporation, from selling grave markers in competition
with the plaintiff and from charging allegedly excessive fees for their
installation and maintenance. According to the defendant's rules and
13. It should be noted that the defendants apparently did not use such public sources but
instead relied upon their memories of the plaintiff's list.
14. 177 N.E.2d 304 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
15. 114 Ohio App. 143, 176 N.E.2d 268 (1961).

